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Abstract: 
This article is divided into two parts. In the first one, we will ask what place Ricœur reserves for art works 
(particularly figurative) within his philosophical path. We will try to show how this issue is only apparently 
minor and unimportant. In fact, the language of figurative art, totally other than the 
conceptual/argumentative language of the logos, is that which more than any other experience can allow 
philosophy to reflect on otherness, and to discover ‘itself as another.’ In the second part, starting with this 
acquisition, we will ask ourselves what constitutes the singularity of artistic language and the particular 
communication specific to works of art. This will allow us to circle back to the initial question and ask 
ourselves, therefore, what figurative language can teach philosophical communication and what the arts can 
offer philosophy. 
Keywords: Ricœur, Arts, Singularity, Otherness, Hermeneutics. 
Résumé: 
Cet article est divisé en deux parties. Dans la première partie nous nous demandons quelle place Ricœur 
réserve aux œuvres d’art (notamment à l’art figuratif) dans son parcours philosophique. Nous montrons 
comment ce sujet est seulement en apparence mineur et sans importance dans l’œuvre du philosophe. Le 
langage de l’art figuratif, en effet, dans la mesure où il est totalement autre par rapport au langage 
conceptuel/argumentatif du logos, est ce qui, plus que toute autre expérience, peut permettre à la 
philosophie de réfléchir sur l’altérité, et au “soi” de se découvrir “comme un autre.” Dans la seconde partie, 
en partant de ce constat, nous nous demandons ce qui constitue la singularité du langage artistique et la 
particularité de la communication spécifique des œuvres d’art. Cette approche nous permet alors de revenir 
à notre question initiale et de nous demander ce que le langage figuratif peut enseigner à la communication 
philosophique et ce que les arts peuvent offrir à la philosophie. 
Mots-clés: Ricœur, arts, singularité, altérité, herméneutique. 
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This article is divided in two parts. In the first one, of a more introductory nature, we will 
ask what place Ricœur reserves for works of art (particularly figurative) within his philosophical 
path. We will try to show how this issue is only apparently minor and unimportant, because, in 
truth, in this ‘dialogue’ between the conceptual work (philosophical) and the work of the image 
(artistic) is hidden one of the most significant experiences of Ricœur’s dialogic hermeneutics. The 
language of figurative art, in fact, totally other than the conceptual/argumentative language of the 
logos, is that which more than any other experience can allow philosophy to reflect on otherness, 
and to discover ‘itself as another.’ 
In the second part, starting with this acquisition, we will ask ourselves what constitutes 
the singularity of artistic language and the particular communication specific to works of art. We 
will see, with Ricœur, how this particularity lies in the ability of the painter (and the work) to 
speak one to one (from the creator to the user), through the experience of “emotional contagion.” 
This will allow us to circle back to the initial question and ask ourselves, therefore, what 
figurative language can teach philosophical communication and what the arts can offer 
philosophy. 
The final answer will again be twofold. On the one hand, we will indicate in the 
continuation of the dialogue between the Ipse of philosophy and the Otherness of works of art, one 
of the legacies of Ricœurian hermeneutics; on the other hand, we will ask if one to one 
communication could not be and become an effective strategy for the philosophical word and 
writing. 
Art as the ‘Other’ of Philosophy 
What place does Ricœur reserve for art works (especially figurative) in his philosophical 
path? If we were to respond by considering the number of books or pages that the philosopher 
devotes to the issue, we could only say that it is an insignificant place. There is no monograph, 
but only a few occasional articles, and some interviews specifically on the subject. 
Certainly, the theme of the image (and imagination) is not extraneous to Ricœur’s path1 
and also a general discussion on works of art emerges in different places in his texts, especially 
when he deals with the metaphor and narrative.2 However, it remains a matter to ponder: in view 
of the specific attention given to other languages, disciplines, and experiences, his examination of 
the value of works of art appears to remain in the shadows; as well as in view of the many 
specific analyses of texts on the philosophical and literary tradition, for the most part Ricœur 
rarely made specific hermeneutical analyses of paintings. So much so that, to paraphrase what 
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George Taylor said on the theme of imagination, we could say: it remains somewhat enigmatic 
that Ricœur did not himself publish a volume more directly on Art.3  
On this issue, Saulius Geniusas recently wrote an essay (Against the Sartrean Background 
Ricœurs Lectures on Imagination),4 in which he also analyzed Ricœur’s still unpublished Lectures on 
Imagination (Chicago: 1975).5 In these Lectures, we can find some examples taken from the history 
of painting. However, Geniusas himself had to admit that  
nonetheless, one cannot overlook that Ricœur presents his phenomenology of painting in 
a severely underdeveloped form. What we came across in the Lectures is nothing more 
than a set of references coupled with underdeveloped insights, which, regrettably, are not 
articulated in any greater detail anywhere else.6 
Why then should we wonder about Ricœur and figurative art? And is it true that art 
occupies a secondary and marginal role within Ricœurian hermeneutics? Let us try to start 
answering by returning to an obvious exception to what we have just said: Rembrandt. Ricœur 
devotes, for example, a few pages to a self-portrait of the Dutch painter, from 1660. It becomes an 
opportunity for reflection, not only on this type of pictorial genre, but also on the very possibility 
of portraying ‘oneself.’ The essay, entitled Sur un auto-portrait de Rembrandt7 is now in Vol. 3 of 
Lectures. For our purposes, however, even more interesting are the observations which Ricœur 
makes on another work by Rembrandt: Aristote contemplant un buste d’Homère (1653). The analysis 
can be found in Le philosophe, le poète et le politique, an interview with Edmond Blattchen, later 
published in the small volume L’unique et le singulier.8 What is striking is not only the technical or 
hermeneutic interpretation of the painting, but Ricœur’s explicit declaration: “This is the symbol 
of the philosophic endeavor, as I perceive it.”9 Why? – we may ask. Because, on the one hand, we 
see ‘the philosopher’ par excellence (Aristotle) and, on the other hand, we have ‘the poet’ par 
excellence (Homer). Rembrandt, then, shows us an ideal dialogue between philosophy and poetry. 
However, here the term poetry should be understood in a broad sense. In fact, shortly after 
Ricœur says, “I extend the term ‘poetic’ beyond the meaning of rhyme and rhythm, to the sense 
of the production of meaning, […] of energy that creates innovation.”10 
Here, then, Homer is the symbol of the work of art in general; he is the symbol of a 
language that “creates meaning,” as a “creative, primitive, original and originating energy,”11 
according to Ricœur’s words. Heidegger would say that here ‘poetry’ is poiesis meant as ‘creation’ 
in the broadest sense of the word. So, we have Aristotle (that is Ricœur) that ‘touches’ the bust of 
Homer (that is the ‘arts’). In this painting, then, we have the iconic representation of the 
relationship that, according to Ricœur, there is and there should be between arts and philosophy. 
This is doubly interesting: first, because as a symbol of his ‘entreprise philosophique’ 
Ricœur chooses a painting. Second, because this painting shows us how ‘his’ dialogue with the 
poetics of the arts was central in Ricœur’s self-interpretation. In short, Ricœur does not choose the 
image of a philosopher in contemplation of the heavens or absorbed in solitary meditations; he 
does not even choose the image of a thinker who reads, in a dialogue with the history of 
philosophy or the history of literature; nor does he show the philosopher in a dialogue with the 
sciences, or with psychoanalysis. Instead, he chooses the image of a thinker who ‘touches’ a poet, 
touches a creator of images and meanings. This is not a random choice, nor even a mere 
suggestive allusion, because then Ricœur continues in his explanation and he tells us, “the 
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philosopher does not begin from nothing. And, moreover, he does not begin from the 
philosophy; he begins from Poetry.”12 So, in some ways, poiesis (i.e. art) comes ‘before’ 
philosophy. Why so? Because – as Ricœur taught us –13 philosophy begins from the pre-
philosophical, from the a-philosophical, from what is ‘other’ from philosophy itself. 
Paraphrasing a famous Latin expression (primum vivere deinde philosophari) we might say: 
first there is life, then comes philosophy to interpret it; first there is experience, then 
conceptualization.  
The arts (as we will demonstrate in the second part) are closer to life and experience, 
because they do not ‘communicate’ through conceptual language (as philosophy does), but 
‘communicate’ through images and emotions. However, beyond this anticipation, Ricœur’s quote 
is clear: art has priority over philosophy. If philosophy is ‘superior’ in its ‘living’ interpretative 
capacity (“the poet is immortalized in marble, while the philosopher is alive, that is always 
continues to interpret”),14 nevertheless, art is ‘superior’ in its creation of meaning.  
This means that it is first necessary that there be a creative energy of innovation, in order 
then to achieve a second level of communication. [...] Philosophy is reflective, it is always 
work on a second degree.15  
In this sense, if we are allowed to make a pun, we can say that in Ricœur there is no 
longer a ‘philosophia prima,’ because the essence of philosophy is to be ‘second,’ reflexive: with a 
second level of language and work on a second degree. Without the ‘first’ that precedes it and 
‘gives’ it something to think about, philosophy would lose its meaning. Therefore, philosophy 
needs the pre-philosophical and the pre-conceptual. 
I would like to try to express this idea in even more stringent terms, to borrow the 
expression from one of Ricœur’s most famous texts: Oneself as Another.16 So, I would say this: 
without its ‘otherness,’ philosophy would not be itself. Philosophy becomes what it is because of 
all that is ‘other’ than philosophy itself. The other of philosophy (the pre-philosophical and a-
philosophical) is that from which philosophy is born, it is that to which it is prone and from 
which it returns, and it is the inevitable reference point in the constitution of its identity. When 
we say ‘oneself as another’ in ‘as’ we denote precisely this: that without the relationship with 
otherness no selfhood is possible. In the same way, without the relationship with what is ‘other’ 
than philosophy, there would be no philosophy. 
Oneself as Another, then, is not only the title of the most famous book by Ricœur, but 
perhaps it is also the key to his hermeneutical philosophy, i.e. the root and the meaning of his 
interpretative and dialogic philosophy. It is no coincidence that many interpreters have called 
him “the philosopher of all the dialogues.”17 His philosophy as a matter of principle is dialogue: 
with the history of philosophy, of course, but also with the sciences (the humanities and the 
natural sciences). His philosophy, as a matter of principle, is dialogue with ‘otherness.’ And all of 
this is possible (and necessary) in Ricœur’s view, because – we could say – philosophy is oneself as 
another, it is a dialogue with what is different from itself.  
Just as each of us would not be himself without the internal dialogue with the otherness 
that inhabits us (and that we ourselves are… as another,) just as each of us would not be himself 
without the dialogue (conscious or unconscious, verbal or non-verbal) that we have always been, 
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from the moment we are born until the last moment of our life (a dialogue with those around us, 
with the ‘you,’ with ‘everyone,’ with friends and with enemies, with the books we read and with 
the symbols of the stories: the story that we live),18 so it also is for philosophy, which would not 
be itself, if it were not in internal dialogue with its own history, but also in dialogue with all that 
philosophy is not. 
The Rembrandt painting, in Ricœur’s interpretation, reminds us of this. “Philosophy is 
always a second degree labor, […] a second level of discourse.”19 The work of interpretation (of 
logos, so to speak) always arises from something that precedes it: i.e., “ordinary language, that of 
the sciences, psychoanalysis, poetic discourse.”20 This is what Ricœur did throughout his whole 
life, multiplying the others, multiplying the discourses, languages, disciplines with which he 
chose to enter into dialogue; to enrich – in this mediation – philosophy itself and to generate it. 
Now, given all this, the question with which we began becomes even more complex, so 
much so as to present us with a paradox. Indeed, if what we have said is true (if Rembrandt’s 
painting is, for Ricœur, the symbol of philosophy itself), then Ricœurian philosophy should have 
poetic language, or at least the language of art in general, as its privileged partner (as its 
privileged ‘other’). 
Instead, on the contrary, as we said at the beginning, Ricœur does not speak in a 
systematic and clear way of his relationship with the poetic and the artistic. To understand it – i.e. 
to understand what is, de facto, in any case, a key to decisive self-interpretation (precisely as the 
choice of this painting by Rembrandt shows) – we have to dig into the folds of the unspoken 
Ricœur. In short, we have to look for the theme of the relationship between philosophy and art in 
scattered quotations and various interviews. 
Even Francois Azouvi and Marc de Launay in the final chapter of their Conversations with 
Ricœur (Critique and Conviction) open the discussion in this way: 
In your life, art has always held a prominent place; you regularly go to museums, you 
listen to a wide range of music. However, in your work, this dimension of human 
experience is singularly lacking, if we set aside your analyses of literature.21 
Why? Probably the reason is to be found in the choice of what Ricœur called “the long 
road” of interpretation. As we know, from the end of the ‘60s Ricœur chooses to distance himself 
from the ontology of understanding typical of Heidegger (and, in some ways, even Gadamer), 
because he considers it to be the “short road” of hermeneutics: this not only for its 
methodological style of working without mediation, but also for its avoidance of the strenuous 
work of the epistemology of interpretation.22 Ricœur’s goal is to mend, in the interpretive arc 
theory, the scope of understanding and that of explanation, which, somehow, after Dilthey was 
interrupted23. Obviously, this also means not favoring ‘only’ the dynamics and the experiences 
that have been at the center of the short road of understanding, but really opening up to ‘all’ 
possible dialogues. Ricœur’s shift of hermeneutic attention onto the theory of the text and action 
is thus simultaneously a deliberate distancing from the horizons which were, instead, 
investigated by Heidegger and Gadamer. To be more precise, Heidegger can put the relationship 
between philosophy and poetry (or between truth and works of art) at the center of his ontology, 
because it remains within the short road of understanding and a certain anti-epistemological way 
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of understanding hermeneutics. The same applies to Gadamer, who can favor the ontology of the 
game and the work of art because he seeks an extra-methodological path of truth. Ricœur, 
however, made a precise choice of field and, therefore, cannot favor, within his hermeneutic 
analysis, the aesthetic or poetic experience. To the extent that he delivered to himself (and us) the 
warning, “explain more to understand better,” he inevitably had to follow the path of 
interpretation of these ‘signs’ that more than others allow for the evident and strong application 
of the theory of the hermeneutical arc: and so, the text, the action, the narrative and then the Self.  
In short, it is also, and above all, to clarify his distance from Heidegger and Gadamer that 
Ricœur does not work directly, solely, specifically on the artistic and poetic experience. This 
means neither that he is not interested in the aesthetic dimension nor that he does not consider it 
decisive from the experiential point of view. It just means that from the point of view of his own 
intellectual journey, Ricœur did not consider writing about art to be a priority. 
On the other hand, we have a very clear analogon in the choice that Ricœur makes at a 
certain point in his career: that of not writing (any more) a book on the Poetics of Transcendence. As 
we know, the great undertaking of Philosophie de la volonté remains an interrupted project. The 
first volume (1950) and the second (1960), should have been followed by a third: Poetics of the 
Will.24 However, this volume was never published and Ricœur never wrote this Poetics in its 
intended form.25  
Quant à la poétique de la Transcendance, je ne l’ai jamais écrite, si l’on attend sous ce titre 
quelque chose comme une philosophie de la religion, à défaut d’une philosophie 
théologique; mon souci, jamais atténué, de ne pas mêler les genres m’a plutôt rapproché 
de la conception d’une philosophie sans absolu. […] Je ne dirais pourtant pas que rien n’a 
été réalisé de ce que j’appelais alors une poétique. La symbolique du mal, La métaphore vive, 
Temps et récit, se réclament à plusieurs égards d’une poétique.26  
Ricœur never wrote a Poetics (in the strict sense of the term), despite having always 
maintained this ideal tension in his path, a tension which is particularly evident in his later 
writings. Similarly, for the same reasons, he never wrote an aesthetics, despite his awareness of 
the intimate, primordial dialogue that his philosophy had with the ambit of the ‘creation’ and the 
image. However, we can say, this ideal tension (in the relationship between conceptual language 
and the language of the image) is strongly present throughout his path, and resurfaces with 
greater freedom in his final years. 
In the same way that, more and more clearly, starting in the late ‘60s, he distinguishes the 
pole of ‘conviction’ from that of ‘critique,’ so too, perhaps (we can assume), Ricœur distinguishes 
artistic experience from the strictly epistemological. Just as he decides to ‘keep separated’27 the 
ambit of religion from that of the philosophical, to be able to move more freely in both (for the 
first area, as a man of faith; for the second, as a professional philosopher), in the same way, he 
seems to separate the area of the hermeneutic from that of the aesthetic, initiating – taking the 
liberty to paraphrase – almost a ‘prohibition’ (interdit de séjour) against art in philosophy, 
specifically to escape the risks and limits of the ‘short’ ontology of understanding. 
However, not surprisingly, as in Ricœur’s last work (freed from the fear of confusing 
areas), he returns to work on issues on the border between ‘conviction’ and ‘critique’ (the 
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religious and the philosophical); he also returns with more freedom in some essays and 
interviews to work on the border between hermeneutics and aesthetics. It is no coincidence, in 
this sense, that Critique and Conviction ends with a chapter entitled Aesthetic Experience, in which 
an analysis on the work of art and mystical-religious observations are interwoven. 28 
So, summing up conclusively this first point, we can say that: on the one hand, from 
Ricœur’s point of view, the most intimate otherness of philosophy is precisely Poetics and Art in 
the broadest sense, while, on the other hand, the fact remains that, in order not to risk a certain 
romanticism and aestheticism and to distance himself decisively from the ‘short route’ of 
Heidegger, Ricœur does not thematize an aesthetic discourse exclusively or centrally. Rather, 
paradoxically (as he does for specifically religious issues), he almost hides this original and 
intimate dialogue with the arts. He does not explicate it, advertise it, nor externalize it. So much 
so, that Ricœur – as we said already – never dedicated a Monograph to poetry, let alone art. 
This is also the reason why, still today, there is no systematic reflection on Ricœur and 
the hermeneutics of art. However, art and poetics in general are and remain fundamental keys 
(hidden, concealed, yet decisive) in Ricœurian thought.  
How, then, can we approach this subject? It is inevitable that we will take as ‘sources’ the 
few places in his texts in which Ricœur, in his later years, more directly addresses the experience 
of the work of art, which are, besides L’unique et le singulier with which we began, two interviews 
conducted in 1995 and in 1996 respectively. We have already mentioned the first, Aesthetic 
Experience in Critique and Conviction; the second is, Arts, Language and Hermeneutic Aesthetics. 
Interview with Paul Ricœur. Conducted by Jean-Marie Brohm and Magali Uhl.29 Moreover, no scholar 
has thus far written on Ricœur’s hermeneutics of art, linking the content of these two interviews. 
If you read these pages carefully, you quickly understand that there are many issues at 
play. It would be impossible to address them all in the space of an essay. We will limit ourselves, 
therefore, to addressing the heart of the matter, wondering, then, how and why, according to 
Ricœur, art is ‘other’ than philosophy, and what constitutes, in short, the singularity of artistic 
language and the particular form of communication inherent to artwork? 
The Language of the Work of Art: from Emotional Singularity to Communicative 
Universality 
We can anticipate the response that we will later verify: art is ‘other’ than philosophy 
because it does not tell about the world through representations and concepts, but by iconizing 
emotional experiences. Art can do this because (while aiming for communication and, thus, 
transmitting something ‘universally’) the language of art moves on the level of ‘singularity’ 
(experienced and expressed by the individual artist and received by the individual user) and not 
at the abstract conceptual level. 
Let us try to figure out how all this will play out in Ricœur’s discourse. In our opinion, it 
is no coincidence that in Arts, Language and Hermeneutic Aesthetics Ricœur begins with Kant 
because in the Critique of Judgment Kant clearly addresses the relationship between the universal 
and the singular, from two different perspectives: the determinative judgment (which we may 
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say is characteristic of philosophical argumentation) and the reflective one, which instead is 
specific to the aesthetic experience. 
I believe that to clarify the question and direct the answer, we must situate ourselves in 
the work of the Universal, because here we have a Universal that Kant, at the beginning of 
the third Critique, opposes to the Universal of the determinative judgment. This latter 
posits the rule, and experience is subsumed under it; the case is therefore placed under the 
rule. The inverse situation is in this sense exceptional and incredibly disconcerting 
(déroutante). It is the case of the aesthetic judgment; here all the judgments are singular, 
but precisely singular, not by way of subsumption, but by direct apprehension. […] What 
continues to effect the force of the Kantian analysis is that there is nevertheless the 
universal. With all his might Kant resists the idea that one cannot discuss colors and 
tastes, which would isolate each of us in his pleasure, in his mood. Now, how can there be 
a universal? The great force of the Kantian solution is to have staked everything on the 
idea of communicability. Communicability is the modality of the universal without 
concepts.30  
Ergo: Ricœur in his hermeneutics of the work of art enacts the same choice regarding the 
Cogito in Oneself as Another, hence rejecting both the way of objective and absolute substantiality 
and that of nihilistic dispersion. 
While it is true that, after the artistic and philosophical experience of the 20th century, we 
cannot ‘substantialize’ the idea of beauty and we can no longer believe that a work is universally 
‘beautiful’ (in the sense of objectively beautiful for everyone), on the other hand, we must not 
give up ‘thinking about’ the question of beauty and we cannot relegate it to mere individualistic 
moodiness. Between idem and anti-idem there is the question of the beauty of a work of art, which 
is not reducible to an objective sameness (idem), but neither can it be dissolved into the 
nothingness of an in-significant relativism (anti-idem). 
Thus, Ricœur returns to Kant. However, even in the aesthetic what he proposes is 
basically a post-Hegelian Kantianism. In fact, as we know, Ricœur often called himself a post-
Hegelian Kantian: not because he was interested in the answers of Kant, but because he found the 
universalizing tension of the thinker (his attempt to hold the universal to the singular) to be 
interesting.31 This is the hermeneutic heritage of Kant, according to Ricœur. This is the recovery 
that hermeneutics can make of Kantian tension, after Hegel, after historicism, after the risks of 
historical relativism. Ricœur calls it: “the post-Kantian benefit of a return to the Kantian aesthetic 
[…], the reconquest of the transhistorical over the historical constitutes.”32 We could also call it 
the recapturing of a universal/universalizing moment in the singular/individualizing moment. Of 
course, today we can no longer do this in Kantian terms, we can no longer think that there is a 
universal beautiful. Today less than ever. Who could say that ‘Munch’ or ‘Picasso’ are universally 
beautiful?  
On the other hand, today we no longer have any illusions that classical art was 
universally beautiful. Just think of Aphrodite of Knidos (Praxiteles), which was rejected by its 
buyers, because it did not meet the criteria for beauty of its era. Classical beauty does not exist. It 
is a myth. However, Ricœur reminds us (learning it not only from Kant, but also from authors 
like Hegel, Marx, Heidegger, Gadamer) that a work of art has its own trans-historicity. It exceeds 
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its period, despite being created in its period (“the work of art escapes the history of its 
constitution.”) “The result here is in excess of its production.”33 Therefore, it can speak to every 
era, beyond its era. This is its first form of universality, universalizability: a work of art is 
universal (or at least can be universal) because it speaks, because it communicates, because it is 
communicable. 
So, then Ricœur shifts the problem of the universality of the artwork to the aspect that 
interests him most, i.e. the language. We have someone/something that speaks (the artist, the 
artwork) and someone who sees, listens, reads, interprets, uses, receives. Just as a book is 
potentially addressed to “a temporally open and indefinite public,”34 so is every work of art. 
However, what makes it possible for a work to be communicable? Ricœur responds with a term 
we could call typical of a certain French philosophy: monstration. “The fact that a work of art 
aims, beyond the intentionality of its author, and insofar as it is a work of art, to be shared, 
therefore first of all to be shown.”35 
A work made to show itself, that is, to communicate, that is, to create sharing “between 
the creator and his public.”36 This is evident in what Ricœur (with Henri Gouhier) calls the arts of 
two times:37 “those where the existence of the work requires a second time, which is that of its 
recreation: theatrical representation, musical execution, choreographic realization beginning with 
the writing of a libretto, of a score, of a script.”38 
It is clear that a work is made to be shown. There is no theater if not in front of a viewer. 
There is no concert if not in front of a listener. However, according to Ricœur, this also applies to 
those that Gouhier calls the arts of one time, (“those where the existence of the work coincides with 
its creation: painting and sculpture, for example”),39 because, even in this case, what makes an 
artwork an artwork (and lets it continue to communicate beyond the limits of time) is its ability to 
re-create itself in those who come into contact with it. Indeed, ‘it is perhaps here, in this indefinite 
capacity to be reincarnated, and in a way each time historically different, but substantially and 
essentially founding, that the profound signified’ of a work of art emerges.40 
It is ‘monstration’ (i. e.: showing itself in one time, but being potentially open to infinite 
reception in all times) that lays the foundation for the possibility of a work to communicate. So, 
what does ‘communication’ mean for Ricœur, when this term refers to works of art? 
Communication is nothing more than recreation, reincarnation, “monstration renewed 
endlessly:”41 i.e. interpretation. This is clear, immediate, in the case of reading a book. Ricœur says: 
“each plot is singular and has exactly the status of the work of art according to Kant: the 
singularity capable of being shared.”42 Each book, we might say, is one and one hundred thousand. 
Indeed, it is the whole of all interpretations that have been given to that book (Gadamer calls it 
‘history of effects’). However each time ‘that book’ is ‘my’ book, because the story speaks to me and 
it tells me things it does not tell others. This is the core of Ricœurian hermeneutics: the aim of the 
interpretation is not so much, or only, to understand the work of art in itself (i.e. try to 
understand what the author meant, his language, his historical or psychological context), but to 
understand oneself in front of the work of art. 
Here Ricœur recaptures a metaphor of Proust. Novels are like magnifying glasses that 
authors give to readers, so that they can look inside themselves and try to discover parts of 
themselves that, before reading that novel, were completely unknown.43 However, this applies to 
every work of art, if we really encounter it, if the encounter really happens. In the same way that, 
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if I let myself be met by a person (if I let the person in front of me question who I am), after 
having met him/her, I am no longer the same (I may come out of it enriched, or wounded, but, in 
any case, he/she will have left a mark on me, I will be changed), in the same way, if the work of 
art speaks to me and if I let it talk, this encounter will change me. It is the process of 
reconfiguration; or, we can say, the self/other dialectics, which we spoke of at the beginning. 
Ricœur says: “as reader, I find myself only by losing myself.”44 It is the first moment: the distance 
from self, from the world; it is losing oneself in reading, losing oneself in the work of art, losing 
oneself in the other: because I want to listen, I want to try to understand what it has to tell me, I 
want to be enriched by its otherness. 
Then there is the return to self, the reconfiguration. I close the book; the concert ends; I 
leave the museum; the dialogue with that person ends. What did he/she/it tell me, in this 
meeting? How have I been changed? How has my identity changed, thanks to that otherness? It 
is what Ricœur calls ‘mimetic reconfiguration.’ In the case of the work of art, “the creativity of the 
art consists, penetrating the word of everyday experience in order to rework it from inside.”45 
However, this is clear, and, in any case, in our opinion the originality of Ricœur’s discourse lies 
not so much, or only, in this. Gadamer spoke of this perhaps in a clearer and more original way. 
Let us return to the problem of singularity, because it is here, as we said, that Ricœur’s argument 
plays on a particular and paradoxical level: perhaps questionable; but that, for this very reason, 
makes us think. In fact, at this point Ricœur turns to Kant, and tries to recover another of his 
questions. We could say: the one about genius. Why is every doodle not a work of art? What is 
the secret of an artwork? Why does one work of art speak to me, communicate to me, tell me 
something, and another does not? 
Of course, we could move the conversation to the historical level again (Ricœur also does 
so and remembers: only looking to the past can we say with certainty that a work was a work of 
art; if it has exceeded its historical significance and continued to speak in later times). However, 
this is a question of art history, or of the history of art criticism. It is not a hermeneutic-existential 
question. The hermeneutic-existential question is instead: why does this work speak to me? The 
question is not trivial.  
It is not only a challenge to the aesthetic-relativistic theory of taste. It is obvious and 
much too easy (more now than at the time of Kant) to say that there is not an objective beauty or 
pleasure, that beauty is in the eye of the beholder, so what I like speaks to me. So, I like Magritte 
and Magritte speaks to me. Another person likes Bach and Bach speaks to him. A third party likes 
Godard and Godard speaks to her. This is certain and obvious. However, the question is: what 
makes a work (in its singularity, in its difference from all the other works) speak to me, in my 
singularity, in my difference from all the others, a difference that is not only of taste, but also of 
history, culture, world, origin? The question is decisive, in our opinion, because it touches 
(perhaps beyond what Ricœur himself realized) the heart of the hermeneutics theory. Indeed, it is 
the same question that I ask myself when I am with someone else. And I choose him: to have a 
dialogue, to interweave our stories, of friendship, of love, of sharing, of work, or even just to walk 
a stretch of road together: why does his/her singularity meet my singularity? Is an ‘us’ truly 
possible? Where does this sharing (communication, communion) begin and where does it lead? 
Even here, in our view, the work of art can become a hermeneutical model. So, we return to our 
question, which is only seemingly trivial. Why does this work speak to me? A question that 
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clearly supposes at least two others: why and how does a work of art speak? And: why and how 
do I listen to it, can I listen to it?  
We have to start again from the discussion about the communication/communicability of 
the artwork. What is it? Ricœur links the term ‘communicability’ with the term ‘contagiousness.’ 
“Communicability is the modality of the universal without concepts; it is a matter of a powder 
train, of contagion (de traînée de poudre, de contagion) from one case to another.”46 It is a 
communicability, universality, linguisticity (so to speak) that is universal without being 
conceptual. We could say (following the suggestive metaphor of fire and contagion) that it moves 
on an emotional level. However, of course, Ricœur does not believe in the ‘hysteria of the masses’ 
and the contagion he speaks of is not unbridled pathos.  
Let us stop this, though, for the moment: it is a communicability in which what is at play 
is not so much, and not only, the level of verbal communication, but the imaginative-affective 
level. It is a communicability in which what is at stake is not so much the conceptual level, as the 
iconic-emotional level. Embracing and reintroducing an insight of Heidegger’s, Ricœur points out 
that our existence is affective (first of all, and more than reflexive) and the infinity of our 
emotions is varied with nuances often unknown to us, not yet explored. Our soul is like a musical 
instrument. We are like a ‘musical instrument’ that vibrates differently, depending on how it is 
touched and depending on the keys (or strings) which are lightly touched. It can be the melody of 
the world, of a particular event (happy or sad) that plays it. It can be the symphony of love or the 
screech of rage, of a struggle, of despair that makes it vibrate. However, even reading a book, 
listening to a poem, looking at a picture, or listening to a song can modulate the strings of our 
soul. “Although, at the limit, could not one say that to each piece of art there corresponds a mood? 
The work of art in effect is referred to an emotion which has disappeared as emotion, but which 
has been preserved as a work.”47 
This is the key of our question. The essence of a work of art consists in this: it preserves, 
concentrates an emotion in a work of art. It ‘iconifies’ it. As a symbol concentrates in itself several 
possible meanings, in the same way, a work of art concentrates in itself a possible universe of 
emotions. Of course, this applies to every word, to every experience, but, in the case of art – 
exactly because there are fewer words, there is less of a concept (there is more silence, less 
conceptual representation, more space for the mood) – there is a greater concentration of 
imaginative-emotional meaning.  
So, we are ready to respond to our question: why does a work of art speak, how does it 
communicate? “The work expresses the word by iconizing the singular emotional relation of the 
artist to the word, which I have called the mood.”48 There is, at the beginning, the artist’s singular 
emotional relationship with regard to the world. There is, says Ricœur, a “singular grasp” of 
reality, which is not related to whether a work of art is more or less similar to reality. 
If [a work] deserves to figure today in our imaginary museum, it is because […] its genuine 
object was not the fruit bowl or the face of the young girl in the turban but the singular grasp by 
Cézanne or Vermeer of the singular question posed to them.49  
A work of art is a singular grasp (a singular emotional relationship) by the artist, a grasp 
of the singular question that is put to the artist in the expression of the world. What does this 
mean? An obvious example is Monet, and his water lilies.50 Another example is Cézanne. Why 
R. 
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did Cézanne feel the need to make more than fifty copies of Montagne Sainte-Victoire? Is it not 
always the same mountain? No, it’s never the same.  
It is as if it were necessary for Cézanne to do justice to something that was not the idea of 
the mountain – not the terms we use in general discourse – but that represented the 
singularity of this mountain, here and now, […] what insists on receiving the iconic 
augmentation the painter alone can confer upon it.51 
The mountain does not exist as an idea, as a universal. There is only ‘this’ mountain ‘here 
and now,’ calling me, asking to be painted, asking to receive that emotional concentration (iconic 
increase) that only the painter can give it. There is no universal question, but a singular question 
that requires a singular response: from the singularity of the artist, in the singularity of this 
particular situation of time, space, atmosphere, and feeling. 
The artist is the person who perceives (Ricœur says) this question, this appeal, this 
“urgency of an unpaid debt with respect to something singular that had to be said in a singular 
manner:”52 and the artist ‘says’ it. The surprising thing is that this singular communicates 
something universal. 
[The] naked experience as such was incommunicable; but, as soon as it can be 
problematized in the form of a singular question which is adequately answered in the 
form of a response that is singular as well, then it acquires communicability, it becomes 
universalizable.53 
This is the wonderful strangeness, the amazing possibility of art. Experience (of the artist, 
but of every man, every one of us) is always naked experience. They are incommunicable, like 
each unique experience (mine only), like each individual emotion (mine only). How can I express 
it, how can I communicate it? The other will perceive it starting from himself (as his experience) 
and not as I live it, as mine. However, in every naked experience there is a question, there is an 
appeal, an urgency, a need, that is to be said, communicated. In every naked experience, I wish that 
this not be just mine, that it be shared, shareable. How is this possible? The mystery of art shows 
us a way. The painter (musician, filmmaker, poet, writer), with colors, lines, fullness and 
emptiness, silences and notes, moving images, metaphors and narratives, tries to concentrate his 
singular experience in a particular moment of his life and his story. He iconifies his emotional 
relationship with the world here and now. He renders the different aspects of this ‘here and now’ 
“ever denser” and he “intensifies them in condensing them,” in the same way that a symbol, or a 
metaphor does. He gathers a “polysemy,”54 which is the infinite polysemy of experience, of life. 
“The work of art can have an effect comparable to that of metaphor: integrating levels of sense 
that are overlaid, preserved and contained together.”55 
Ordinary language, in his practice, in the wear and tear of use, in becoming a mere 
instrument of communication, often fails in communication. It fails precisely where what it 
would like to communicate is deeper and more intense. Indeed, it does not reach those depths. It 
remains in the superficiality of general communication; it remains in the general, in the generic. 
This generality (the ordinary conceptuality of language, in which each word corresponds to one 
thing), fails in expression, because it is not able to say, in the way art does, this is a pipe; this is 
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love; this is pain. It is not the same with the universality of art, which, instead, knows that 
experience is singular and is only concerned with communicating its own singularity. 
No one can die for me. No one can live for me. No one can see this cathedral for me and 
paint it for me. I already know that my response to the appeal of this cathedral is singular, as my 
experience before it is sacred. Ricœur says, “Van Gogh’s Church at Auvers-sur-Oise […] does not 
represent the village church […], but materializes in a visible work what remains invisible, 
namely the unique and probably crazed experience that van Gogh had of it when he painted it.”56 
Therefore, it can speak, can communicate in depth: because it is not communicating an abstract 
and general concept (as ordinary, common language risks doing). It speaks one to one, as 
Kierkegaard would say. It “involves each time a spectator, a listener, a reader who is also in a 
relation of singularity with the singularity of the work.”57 
Every work of art is the experience of a singularity, speaks to a singularity. And, because 
of this, it says different things to each of us. But, exactly for this reason, because it speaks to the 
individual in his singularity, it can, in principle, speak to all individuals; “it is the first act of a 
communication of the work to others and, virtually, to all.”58 Then, you can apply the words of 
Zarathustra to each work of art: this is a work for everyone and for no one. Not for anyone who is 
unwilling to be reached, in his singularity, by the singularity of that work of art; but for all those 
who want to be touched and transformed by its otherness. “The work is like a trail of fire issuing 
from itself, reaching me and reaching beyond me to the universality of humanity.”59 It is the 
powder train/contagion of the communicability of the work mentioned earlier. 
Here then is what the work of art does. “To follow the requirements of singularity to the 
end is to give the best chance of the greatest universality: such is the paradox that must probably 
be maintained.”60 Therefore, the more the artist will be ‘that singularity,’ the more the artist will 
not be affected by profit, by trade, by what is fashionable, the more the artist will perhaps be 
outdated, counter-current, but ‘singular’, ready to tell (as only he knows how, and only he can) 
the urgency of what inside him asks to be told […] the more his work will speak, will 
communicate its singularity; and the more it will communicate to the individual (to us in our 
singularity) universally. Indeed, experience, emotion, and life are singular; and even art. The 
opposite is not art, but a repetition of what has already been said, thought, communicated. And 
with this we can move on to our conclusions, knowing that they will only be open, broken, fragile 
and provisional conclusions, as Ricœur himself has taught us. 
Concluding Remarks: the Dialogue between Philosophy and Arts as a Mutual 
Gift 
We started by asking what was the place of the work of art in Ricœur’s path. On the one 
hand, we have noted how Ricœur ‘iconizes’ his relationship with art through an image (that of 
Aristotle touching the Bust of Homer) that clearly states the centrality of the relationship between art 
and philosophy, and, on the other hand, we have remembered how in Ricœur’s texts the aesthetic 
issue is singularly absent, or at least not thematized in a central and monographic manner. We 
have proposed not so much a solution, but an interpretation of this paradox, linked to the path of 
Ricœur himself, a tortuous path, which proceeds “by returning, taking a step backwards”61 and 
that in the 60s and 70s strongly chose the way of an ‘epistemological’ hermeneutics that 
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deliberately set aside those fields of experience that might be too close to the level of personal 
‘conviction’ or individual/singular experience (as is the case with religious experience and, in a 
different and yet comparable way, as is the case with aesthetic experience). Ricœur needs to keep 
the spectrum of ‘all’ his dialogues wide, and (also to distance himself from decisions such as 
those of Heidegger and Gadamer, who value more than all others the central themes of the art 
work and poetry), he chooses not to tie his hermeneutics primarily to the artistic-poetic ambit. In 
the ‘90s, however, a certain distance from himself also allows Ricœur to return to those areas in 
the past perhaps insufficiently themed. It is the case of what he himself called ‘the biblical 
exegesis exercises’; it is the case of the theme of Poetry, which will become ‘symbol’ of the 
experience of Love as opposed to that of Justice (compared instead to Prose);62 it is the case of the 
aesthetic experience, which re-emerges in the pages of some essays and, especially, some 
interviews. 
The first thing that we can conclusively ask ourselves, then, is if this ‘legacy’ of Ricœur 
still needs to be deepened and revitalized, if it is not possible today to evoke his insights and 
make his proposal for the hermeneutics of works of art more systematic, ex post applying all the 
instrumentation that he gave us in relationship, for example, to the hermeneutics of the text and 
narration. This would allow us to give a voice and depth to that dialogue between ‘Aristotle’ and 
‘Homer’ that Ricœur iconized more than explained, intuited more than discussed. The second 
thing that we can ask conclusively is what, in Ricœur’s view, art and philosophy can learn from 
each other? 
As we said in our first paragraph, on the one hand, art comes ‘first’ with respect to 
philosophy, because art is closer to experience, existence, uniqueness and it communicates in an 
a-conceptual, emotional, iconic way. On the other hand, regarding the decisive possibility of 
verbal language and argumentation, philosophy comes ‘first’ before art; indeed verbal language 
and argumentation are proper to philosophy and foreign to the artistic experience. In Arts, 
Language and Hermeneutic Aesthetics, Ricœur says, “always remain in language this superiority, 
that it permits us to speak about music”63 and about arts. The arts, indeed, are not meta-reflexive. 
“Works of art […] are symbolic devices that cannot produce their own meta-language.”64 
Philosophy, in this sense, if no longer meta/physical, is, and remains, for Ricœur, meta/linguistic. 
Only philosophy can ‘speak’ about language, can interpret. However, what would language (and 
concept, and philosophy) mean (and say) if there were nothing before it, and out of it? Language 
can only say what is ‘other’ from itself. This is where the arts (particularly those devoid of words) 
are superior to the logos.  
“Music makes us think” (donne à penser) – Ricœur writes in a passage of Arts, Language 
and Hermeneutic Aesthetics. However, this expression can clearly be extended to all art forms (as 
we can understand from reading in full the interview cited above).65 Art makes us think, gives rise 
to thought and gives a gift66 to conceptual thinking, to philosophy. Philosophy is the recipient, the 
arts are the donors. However, if – in the logic of the gift – the donor precedes the recipient, then 
the arts (and, in general, ante-predicative, pre-conceptual experience) precede philosophy. Or, 
perhaps better, in the logic of the hermeneutic circle – which in Ricœur’s last writings becomes 
the circle of the gift – this is a ‘mutual’ gift, an asymmetrical reciprocity.67 
The arts give philosophy the gift of experience (singular, radical, emotional, iconic to 
think about). Philosophy gives the arts the gift of a possible interpretation. The arts give 
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philosophy the gift of non-verbal signs;68 but philosophy gives the arts the gift of verbal signs, 
verbal meaning. This different speaking about (speaking about the world) becomes the capacity 
to be mutually interpreted. Art and philosophy are two ‘parallel works’ (to quote Ricœur again),69 
two ‘parallels’ that meet each other at infinity, in the infiniteness of their inexhaustibility. There 
would be no art without the possibility/capacity to express moods (and this ability is created with 
language); but there would be no language without all the fulfillment and feeling that remains 
unsaid.  
Ricœur started this ‘parallel work.’ Perhaps today we can continue to carry it forward, in 
two directions. While, on the one hand, as mentioned above, the gift that philosophy can still give 
to art is that of deepening the meaning and possibilities of a (Ricœurian) hermeneutics of the 
work of art, on the other hand what is the gift (from the perspective of what we have discovered 
in these pages with Ricœur) that art can still give to philosophy? 
We believe that this gift is hidden exactly in Ricœur’s discovery of the communication 
process typical of art itself. In fact, the process that Ricœur has described as typical of art belongs 
to every ‘authentic’ form of communication. What happens, in fact, when we want to 
communicate something to someone authentically? When we want to communicate ourselves to 
others – when I want to communicate my singular life, to another individual – I can only do it by 
fully expressing my singularity.70 What we have said about the artist and the work of art then 
applies to every ‘single’ individual and for every ‘singular’ communication. 
The more we are ourselves, in our truth (even contradictory and torn, not masked by 
what is generally said and thought of us,) the more we strip off our masks and we show in our 
fragility (the fragility of our naked existence, poor in words, poor in certainties, poor in 
generalities,) the more we are not influenced by profit, by trade, by what is fashionable, the more 
we are perhaps outdated, counter-current, but singular (ready to tell, as only we can tell, the 
urgency of what inside us, inside me, here and now, in my singular history of life, asks to be 
told)… the more I really talk, I really communicate, because then it is ‘my’ life that speaks, before 
and more than my words. However, this is true for (or, at least, should apply) also to philosophy. 
In my opinion, this is the best gift that art can give to philosophical thought. Philosophy, in 
dialogue with art (like Ricœurian philosophy), can discover something that perhaps goes beyond 
the conclusions of Ricœur himself. Philosophy can discover in fact that, in order to communicate, 
it should not always use only conceptual and argumentative language, but can also use allusive, 
symbolic, emotional language. Perhaps today we are ready to disrupt the dualism from which 
Ricœur began. Perhaps today we are ready to include emotional communication in some way 
within philosophy, we are ready to find that the iconic-affective dimension is not just ‘other’ than 
the philosophical, but ‘is’ and can ‘also’ be philosophical.  
While the other is not only the other who is in front of me, but also the other that I am (me 
as another), then it is also true that the language typical of art (the iconic-affective communication) 
is not only that upon which philosophy can reflect, but it is also that which philosophy can 
experience. I think it is the challenge that thinkers like Ricœur (singular thinkers, thinkers on 
singularity) delivered to us, with their deconstruction of metaphysical-conceptual, abstractive 
philosophy, with their deconstruction of the ‘universal’ philosophy (in the general and generic 
sense of the term ‘universal’). If philosophy was only work of the concept, it could never be 
‘singular’ and could never communicate anything. What is, then, the relationship between 
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singularity and philosophy, between emotion and concept? Can philosophy be communication 
between one individual and another and, if so, how? 
Perhaps it always has been so, despite conceptual philosophy itself; indeed, since the 
time of Plato, “as light that is kindled by a leaping spark,” philosophy has only been the “result of 
communion,” of a life lived together, through dialogue together, conceived together.71 Perhaps it 
still is so, in spite of us, professors of philosophy, and writers of the concept. Perhaps philosophy 
still continues to speak today – within and beyond the logos – from the singularity of those who 
thought (the great philosophers of the past) and of those who still try to think in the present (we 
little philosophy professors) to the singularity of those who read (a book of philosophy), or listen 
(to a lesson in philosophy).  
Can philosophy still communicate something today? Yes, but only if in the lives of those 
who philosophize, teach philosophy, study philosophy, write about philosophy, life first speaks. 
Indeed, even in philosophy, as shown by the more radical philosophers, in their radical tragedy, 
we cannot communicate but in the singular. When a philosophy ‘speaks,’ it is because it is life 
that speaks in that philosophy (the urgency of life, the radical questions of life, the wounds and 
the depths of life… speak in that philosophy): before and more than the words that that 
philosophy has been able to say or will ever say. 
This discovery can be a gift. A gift of art to philosophy. A gift of Ricœur’s aesthetic 
hermeneutics to all of us. 
It is perhaps at the point of the articulation of practice and the pathic that aesthetics has 
something to say […]. What we have said about moods relates equally to the pathic. 
Perhaps here we are in the zone where the aesthetic and the ethical partially overlap. […] 
In language, which is not only practical, there is also the lyrical which one can explore, 
like the story, from the point of view of time. This is the time of the burden, of usury, of 
the sadness of aging, of the nostalgia for what will never return, of the inquietude of what 
menaces or will not come. All this pathic of temporality takes place in that zone of 
connection and actual contamination between the verbal lyrical and the pictorial or 
musical expression of the pathic.72 
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